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special requirements of any one group within the framework of our citizenry must take second place. They must fully understand the nature of the total threat to their security and to their freedom and that this threat is by no means limited to the military sphere. Selfishness, softness, lack of understanding and disinterest can be just as deadly to America's future as any lack of military power. The crises of these times demand patriotism of the highest order. If our people understand this fact, I have no doubt that they will rise fully to the occasion and demonstrate that the strength of free men is far superior to that of any system based on human subjugation and slavery.

## ESPIONAGE IN EMBASSIES

(Mr. PELLY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PELLY. Mr. Speaker, yesterday Ambassador Lodge revealed to the Security Council of the United Nations a Soviet gift to our Moscow Ambassador which had contained a clandestine listening device to enable the Soviet intelligence agents from outside of our Embassy to listen in to the U.S. Ambassador's conversations. Unless one is very naive, it is conceivable that this Russian "Trojan Horse" is only one of hundreds of similar acts of espionage being practiced in our American Embassies in Iron Curtain countries.

All of which, Mr. Speaker, leads me to refer to remarks I made on the floor of the House on May 25, 1959. At that time I criticized the personnel procurement

of the State Department in em-  
ploying nationals of Iron Curtain coun-  
tries in our Embassies in those coun-  
tries. In view of recent events I should like to again urge that the State Department divest itself of any nationals of Communist countries in their employ in Iron Curtain country Embassies.

A year ago when I took this matter up with the State Department it defended its personnel policy, but I felt the arguments advanced to me were extremely weak. In the first place, I was told that the employing of Communist nationals in these sensitive spots created no risk to national security. I was also told that from a budgetary standpoint it was not possible to employ American citizens in the positions presently occupied by foreign nationals, and finally I was told that Americans would not be willing to accept many of these positions now filled by aliens either by reason of inadequate pay or because of the character of the employment.

I said then and I say now such arguments do not hold water. Certainly, with our national security involved, Congress would furnish whatever funds were necessary to support employment of American citizens in these spots, and furthermore, I am sure that there is an abundant supply of American youth who upon graduation from the colleges and universities of this country—especially language students—would jump at the chance to spend a year or so working in our Embassies, regardless of the so-called menial character of the positions that are available.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I state again this policy presents a real risk to the security of the United States and I suggest in light of recent events that the State Department reexamine its personnel policy with reference to the employment of these aliens in our Embassies behind the Iron Curtain.

## THREAT OF SOVIET POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EXPANSION

(Mr. BATES asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. BATES. Mr. Speaker, I am confident that the events of the past week have given many Members of the House cause to reflect on the position of the United States and its role as a bulwark against the threat of Soviet political and economic expansion.

Many of us I am sure shared the hope that perhaps we were on the threshold of a new era. Some called this new era one of peaceful coexistence—others referred to it as a nuclear stalemate. But common to all was the hope that Mr. Khrushchev's visit to the United States was prompted by a burning desire to live at peace with the rest of the world.

Now we know that beneath the smile and the pat on the back was a cynical contempt for the peaceful yearnings of the American people and their allies throughout the world.

In a few days the world will have an opportunity to gage the reaction of the American people and their Representatives in the House to these events which may prove to be a turning point in our relations with the Soviet Union.

I refer to the coming debate on appropriations for the mutual security program. This program looms in these troubled times as a most powerful weapon in arming, militarily and economically, the free world whose hopes were summarily torn asunder by the actions of Mr. Khrushchev and the cynical power-hungry group in the Kremlin for whom he speaks.

I hope that the debate will be one which will hearten rather than dismay the nations which today stand athwart the Soviet Union's approaches to the free world.

I pray that the results of this coming debate will reflect a determination by the House to support the President, his able Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their estimates of the minimum needs of this vital adjunct to our national defense—the mutual security program. Let not the pruning knife weaken the tie that binds us to the rest of the free world.

ADJOURNMENT TO TUESDAY,  
MAY 31

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet on Tuesday next.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, could the gentleman give us any information as to when the

foreign handout bill is going to come before the House?

Mr. McCORMACK. I do not know anything about the handout. The gentleman means the mutual security bill?

Mr. GROSS. That is what President Eisenhower calls it, the handout bill.

Mr. McCORMACK. You can call it the handout bill if you want to, but I cannot go along with that designation.

Mr. GROSS. I want the gentleman to understand that is not original with me; that comes from President Eisenhower, the handout.

Mr. McCORMACK. That was when he was running for the Presidency.

Mr. GROSS. That is right.

Mr. McCORMACK. But now that he is in the Office of President, responsibility has caused him to change his mind.

Mr. GROSS. But they are still his words.

Mr. McCORMACK. But he said it; JOHN McCORMACK did not say it; he said it when he was a candidate for the Presidency.

Mr. GROSS. Yes.

Mr. McCORMACK. But not now that he is President.

Mr. GROSS. Yes; well, I will not accept that amendment.

I am still waiting to find out when the handout bill is going to come up.

Mr. McCORMACK. As to the mutual security appropriation bill, from the best information I have it looks as though it would be ready for floor action about June 13. I cannot give the date specifically but I had inquiry made within a day or two because I wanted to get information myself, and the best information I have is that it will probably be ready for floor action about June 13.

Mr. GROSS. I thank the gentleman and withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet on Tuesday next?

There was no objection.

## POSTPONEMENT OF ROLLCALLS TO WEDNESDAY

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that in the event of a rollcall on Tuesday next in connection with the passage of a bill, a motion to recommit, or any amendment, such rollcall be postponed to the following day, Wednesday, because there is a primary in Alabama.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, what is the legislation to be called up on Tuesday next?

Mr. McCORMACK. The only bill I have on Tuesday that might be called up in the event of a rule being reported by the Rules Committee, is S. 1892, the Norman Federal reclamation project in Oklahoma.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, the gentleman, I understand, expects nothing of any great importance on Tuesday?

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**Mr. McCORMACK.** The only bill I was going to put down for Tuesday was the reclamation project in Oklahoma.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. JONES of Missouri). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

## PROGRAM FOR WEEK OF MAY 31

**Mr. HOEVEN.** Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 1 minute in order to ascertain the program for next week.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa?

There was no objection.

**Mr. McCORMACK.** Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

**Mr. HOEVEN.** I yield.

**Mr. McCORMACK.** On Tuesday next I have calendared the bill S. 1892, dealing with the Norman reclamation project in Oklahoma.

Let me say, frankly, that if the proponents of the bill would prefer that it not be brought up Tuesday I will accommodate them. I have been trying to get in touch with the author of the bill to have a talk with him so I could have definite information about Tuesday.

I talked with him yesterday, and my impression is he was agreeable to it coming up on Tuesday. I want to get rid of these bills as fast as we can because I know what is going to happen on the other end 4 or 5 weeks from now. I want the Members to have their day in court. I am putting consideration of that bill down for Tuesday with the qualification I have stated.

Wednesday is District day, and there is one bill to be considered, H.R. 12036, relating to sewage disposal in the Dulles International Airport. It involves authority to connect up with the District of Columbia system.

Then there is House Resolution 530, giving the Committee on the Judiciary power to investigate certain compacts. That is out of the Rules Committee.

**Mr. HOEVEN.** That will come up on Wednesday?

**Mr. McCORMACK.** I am setting that bill down for Wednesday. If the proponents of S. 1892 for any reason prefer not to take advantage of my assignment of that bill for Tuesday I cannot guarantee that the bill will come up on Wednesday because the District bill has been agreed to by unanimous consent and I am putting the Committee on the Judiciary bill, House Resolution 530, down for that day.

**Mr. AVERY.** Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

**Mr. HOEVEN.** I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.

**Mr. AVERY.** The majority leader said he would want to confer with the sponsor of S. 1892 as to whether or not it would come up on Tuesday. If that does not come up on Tuesday will there be any business scheduled before the House on that day?

**Mr. McCORMACK.** No. I am glad the gentleman asked that question.

For the remainder of the week, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Sat-

urday, and of course I do not expect there will be any Saturday meeting, but in case anything arises I mention Saturday, the following bills will be considered:

H.R. 10572 relating to forests out of the Committee on Agriculture. That was on the program this week but we did not reach it.

**H.R. 11761, Farmers Home Administration.**

**House Concurrent Resolution 661, Joint Committee on National Fuels Policy.**

**House Joint Resolution 402,** transit regulation compact for the Washington metropolitan area.

The consideration of some of these bills is dependent on whether or not a rule is reported out. As far as I can see at this time there is no major bill to come up next week, that is, of a national nature. These are important bills, of course. I do not want to downgrade them.

There is the usual reservation that any further program will be announced later and conference reports may be brought up at any time. There was one reported yesterday on the Post Office and Treasury Department's appropriation bill. When the gentleman in charge will want to bring that up I am unable to state now.

**Mr. HOEVEN.** Can the majority leader tell us what progress we are making with appropriation bills?

**Mr. McCORMACK.** There is one bill, the military construction bill, that is still pending. The gentleman will remember that last week when that came up consideration was postponed because authorization had not been finally passed. I understand the conferees on that bill have agreed. However, even if the conference report is agreed to and the President signs the bill, which it is reasonable to assume he will, and I refer to the authorization bill, my understanding is that the desire of the Member handling the bill is that the bill not come up until week after next, June 9, or thereabouts. That bill will not come up next week. It will be week after next.

The other appropriation bill, of course, is the bill referred to by my friend from Iowa, the mutual security appropriation bill. Or, as my friend, says, the foreign handout bill.

**Mr. GROSS.** I thank the gentleman.  
**Mr. HOEVEN.** I thank the gentleman.

## SUMMIT CONFERENCE COLLAPSE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PUCINSKI] is recognized for 15 minutes.

(Mr. PUCINSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

**Mr. PUCINSKI.** Mr. Speaker, the other body today has launched an investigation into the collapse of the summit conference and what effect this collapse will have on international relations.

The wire stories this morning carried this item as to the purpose of this investigation and the four points or the four areas that the other body will con-

centrate its direction or attention on: First, the events and decisions resulting from the U-2 incident; second, the effect of these events and decision upon the summit; third, the policy of our Government regarding the summit meeting; fourth, the policy of the United States in the future and possible improvement in the execution thereof.

Now, I think a great deal can be learned from these hearings and this investigation, and certainly I am very happy to learn that the other body has undertaken this type of investigation. However, I am disappointed, in reading from this agenda, that apparently no investigation is going to be made of the incidents leading up to this disastrous moment when the U-2 fell into Communist hands on the eve of the summit conference.

I would like to make clear one thing: I do not support the criticism being hurled against our Government for sending these flights over the Soviet Union at a time so close to the summit meeting. I would say, on the contrary, I think that our Government would have been derelict if it had not sent these flights over the Soviet Union as it has been doing for the last 4 years. I believe that we are living under great tension and at this time, more so than any other time, we should know what the Soviets are up to.

We know that Mr. Khrushchev did not expect any success at the summit meeting. We know that Mr. Khrushchev realized that he was going to have to leave the summit a defeated man since the Western Powers had agreed on any number of occasions previous to the summit meeting that they would not yield on Berlin because the people of their respective nations did not want the Western Powers to yield to Khrushchev.

Mr. Speaker, I myself had written the President a letter on the eve of the summit conference, on the eve of his departure for Paris, in which I told him that in a survey made in my own district, 90 percent of my constituents replied "No" when I asked "Should the United States yield to Soviet Russia's demand that we abandon our position in West Berlin?" And also I wrote the President pointing out that 85 percent of my constituents answered "Yes" when I asked them if they believed that the President ought to take a firm stand in demanding freedom and liberation of the captive nations behind the Iron Curtain when he met with Khrushchev at the summit. I sent President Eisenhower this letter to let him know that the people of my district will support him in a firm stand against the Communists.

Certainly, prior to the summit meeting, the Western Powers unequivocally agreed that they were going to remain firm in their position. Khrushchev knew this, and there is no question but what Khrushchev needed a provocation to torpedo the summit conference before it got started.

I think it behooves us, all of us, as Americans, to go beyond the scope of normal assumption in evaluating all aspects of the events that preceded the summit collapse.

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The Chicago Tribune has been writing a series of stories during the debate in the United Nations, pointing out the type of espionage carried on by the Soviet agents right here in our own country. This is an excellent series because it demonstrates the hypocrisy of Khrushchev's anguished outcries against our planes flying over the Soviet Union.

I am also glad to see our own Government start releasing hitherto secret information about the extent of Communist espionage in our own country. I hope the CIA will make more of this information available to the American people so they can see how tirelessly the Communists are working to destroy us. I hope in bringing forth the information, the CIA will surface Col. Jan Monat, the former head of intelligence for the Communist regime in Poland, who defected to our side last year. I am sure Colonel Monat can give us much details about the Communist conspiracy.

The gentleman from Washington, just a few minutes earlier today, related how a microphone had been planted in the American Embassy in Moscow.

Certainly, as I said at the outset of my remarks, while the present investigation being conducted by the other body is laudable indeed, I do hope and feel that some investigation should be made as to why at this particular time, at this crucial moment, when the summit conference was being arranged, this particular U-2 plane should have fallen into Soviet hands, thus giving Mr. Khrushchev this wonderful plum that he needed to break up, to torpedo, the summit conference.

I feel that these things do not just conveniently happen; and while I am not prepared to make any accusations, I think that the American people would be a great deal more comfortable—I know I, myself, would be more comfortable—if I knew that an investigation had been made, a thorough top-to-bottom investigation, of all the incidents preceding this plane flight to ascertain whether in fact this was just an unfortunate coincidence. It may be reasonable to believe that it might have been just a coincidence that the U-2 plane went down at this particular time. We had been making these flights for 4 years and the Soviet Union had not been able to knock down any of these airplanes. It is quite possible the law of averages finally caught up with us. But I have been asked by many of my constituents whether or not anything is being done to find out whether possibly there had been some collusion somewhere along the line in order to give Mr. Khrushchev this plum and I do not believe we should completely ignore this possibility in view of the Soviet's long and despicable history of espionage in our country.

Since there is a tremendous overlapping of jurisdictions in any investigation of this type, with various committees of Congress having jurisdiction over certain segments of this investigation, if it would be in order, I would suggest that perhaps the chairmen and the ranking minority members of the standing committees which have jurisdiction over some phases of all this activity conduct

a joint investigation. I believe this joint committee should include the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the chairman of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, the chairman of the Legislative Oversight Committee, the chairman of the Committee on Government Operations and finally the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, and of course, the ranking minority member of each. I am wondering if, perhaps, they could not get together and lay out some course of action, some plan of investigation to get all the facts of this ill-fated but historic flight.

I believe that since the Camp David meeting, since we made the tragic mistake of inviting Khrushchev to this country—and I said on the floor of this House at that time that it was a mistake to dignify Mr. Mikoyan, Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Kozlov, and all these other Soviet leaders who were brought to this country and welcomed in this country and shown the traditional American hospitality; I said then that it was a mistake to invite these men—I believe that since the Camp David meeting, there appears to have been a sort of lessening of the realization of the fact that if ever we needed security mindfulness in this country, we need it now.

I would like to have the chairmen of these committees get together and see if among themselves they could lay out a course of action to have an investigation of our entire internal security structure in a manner that would not in any way jeopardize our national security.

I am thinking of the many Americans who have been asking the question: Has this airplane really fallen into Soviet hands at this very critical time by pure accident or were there other factors that contributed to it? These people are entitled to an answer.

I am perplexed by one thing in this entire U-2 spy plane affair. The President, in his statement the other day said—and I think the President is to be congratulated for his firmness at the summit, for not yielding to Khrushchev's scandalous demands of an apology; I am in complete agreement with the President on this—but I am a little perplexed in hearing the President say that the initial American reports regarding this U-2 incident were designed as a "cover story," and were purposely distorted to protect the U-2 pilot. The thing that confuses me is that while the President now explains the original mix-up in handling the affair was the result of efforts to protect the pilot, the head of the CIA had earlier told a committee of Congress that the pilot of this airplane had been instructed, if he should fall into enemy hands, to make a clean, full confession of his activities.

I wonder who gave such instructions to this American pilot a spy mission? Certainly such complete disclosure would jeopardize our entire intelligence structure.

This is one of the aspects into which I would like to have this joint committee go more deeply. Why was Pilot

Powers told that if he were caught, he should make a full, clean sweep of things? I know that during the war, when our own American soldiers were captured by the enemy—of course, Mr. Powers was not a member of the military, he was a civilian—but during the war, when our American soldiers fell into enemy hands, we had been instructed to give only our name, rank, and serial number, and that is all.

I am perplexed and disturbed as to why these instructions, if they were in fact given to Powers, were given, and who was responsible for these instructions for Mr. Powers to go out, when he is caught, and tell his captors just exactly what he is doing; why he is doing it; how long he has been doing it, and everything else. This type of instruction, I believe, could jeopardize our American security system as much as anything else. There are many other aspects of this disastrous flight, which could effect the future of the world, that need to be studied by competent authority.

So, while I am in full agreement that our American Government that it should have continued these flights over the Soviet Union—and I do not share the criticism of those who say that these flights should have been stopped—while I am in full agreement with the position that the President has taken, one of firmness at the summit, one of not yielding an inch to Khrushchev, I am disturbed that now when the smoke is beginning to clear apparently no investigation is going to be made as to the incidents precedent to the capture of this aircraft.

I renew my request that, if it is in order, the chairmen of the standing committees of the House get together and sit either as a joint committee or work out some sort of a formula so that investigation of our entire security program in America could be made.

I emphasize again that we would make a tragic mistake if we as Americans did not go beyond the scope of normal assumption. The normal assumption quite properly is that there was nothing wrong, that this was an unfortunate incident where the airplane flamed out and came down to an altitude at which the Soviet Union could then force it down to the ground. That would be the normal assumption, and perhaps that normal assumption is completely justified. But today, when we are dealing with an enemy that is more brutal than the world has ever seen before; an enemy that will resort to any methods of sabotage or espionage; any tactics—and we know this from 15 years of experience in dealing with the Communists and we have ample evidence that they will stop at nothing to destroy us—it then behooves us as Americans to go beyond the normal scope of assumption and find out why these things happened at this particularly convenient time for Mr. Khrushchev to torpedo the summit conference.

Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. HOEVEN. It is my understanding that there are two committees in the Senate, one under the leadership of the dis-

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tinguished Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] and the other under the chairmanship of the distinguished Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON] that are going to conduct full hearings on all matters relating to the failure of the summit conference.

It is my understanding that this investigation will cover all angles, both prior and subsequent to the landing of the U-2 plane, that these investigations will be held at a very high level on a nonpartisan basis, and with the concurrence of the White House, so that the facts may be fully developed.

As to the gentleman's suggestion that the chairmen of several committees of the House conduct an investigation, let me say I am sorry the gentleman has not had the benefit of some of the discussions I have had with relation to that very matter. In the meeting which I attended it seemed to be the general consensus that it would be a mistake to have the committees of Congress go into matters which involve such a delicate situation as our Intelligence. I think we will get the information that the public should have from these committees that are already functioning in the Senate, and that full disclosure will be made not only to the Congress but to the American people.

Mr. PUCINSKI. If the gentleman will permit me, it rather intrigues me why so many of the people who are in charge of our intelligence setup in this country take upon themselves the attitude that they are beyond the scope of Congress. I know from experience—I, myself, in 1952 was an investigator for a congressional committee which investigated a very serious crime committed by the Communists against some 15,000 allied army officers—I must say I was completely unsatisfied, as I delved into these various aspects of American intelligence, with the shoddy operations of our intelligence agencies. I do not see anything wrong, and I do not see anything inconsistent with a suggestion that responsible chairmen of standing committees in Congress conduct such an inquiry. I have complete confidence in these men.

We stood here on the floor of the House of Representatives recently and applauded the speech delivered on the floor of this House by the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations [Mr. CANNON] when he told us he had known of these flights for 4 years. I was very happy to hear that the chairman of this committee had been taken into the confidence of the military. The fact remains that our intelligence people can take into their confidence the chairmen of these standing committees who set up the appropriations and who set up the policies and the various other aspects of our national security. I am not, as a Member of the Congress, ready to surrender those rights to the bureaucracy of any agency.

Mr. HOEVEN. I can understand the gentleman's concern about having the information which he desires.

Mr. PUCINSKI. If the gentleman will permit me, I do not necessarily desire it

for myself, but certainly I do want an appropriate committee of Congress to have it so that we can be certain that there was no collusion or just plain carelessness in giving Khrushchev the tools with which to wreck the summit conference. The gentleman will agree that plain carelessness, when you are dealing in this complicated field of espionage, is just as disastrous to our Nation as outright treason. I think many of our agencies have been just plain careless in dealing with the Soviets and the investigation I am proposing might help improve this situation. It is entirely possible that the U-2 failure ultimately will be traced to sloppy operations. But when we are fighting for our very survival we can no more tolerate carelessness than we can tolerate espionage.

Mr. HOEVEN. I understood you wanted the information as a Member of Congress. Again I say we are dealing with a very delicate subject, to wit, the intelligence and national defense of this country. Would the gentleman want confidential information given to the public which might jeopardize our national defense structure?

Mr. PUCINSKI. No; I do not want to disclose anything which would jeopardize our national defense. I have said many, many times, where matters of national security are at stake, certainly, these things and the secrecy of these proceedings should be respected. I agree with the gentleman. I am not suggesting that. But I would like to say this. Too often I have found that inefficiency and mistakes are covered up by the label "top secret," and I would be glad to get another special order to go into greater detail on that. Too often we have permitted agencies in our Government to mark a situation "top secret" because they could not stand the scrutiny of a congressional committee to decide whether they were conducting themselves properly.

I, for one, feel it is the duty of Congress to see that the conduct of our Federal agencies is such a not to impair the safety of our Nation. I am not satisfied with self-serving statements of department heads who deal in broad generalities. I do not want this Nation to wake up some morning and find that we had failed to properly oversee the activities of essential agencies. In our dealings with the Soviet Union, we can leave nothing to chance and that is why I am suggesting this full-scale investigation. Not just a superficial inquiry, but a full investigation which would minutely check out every conceivable phase of this disastrous U-2 flight. A full-scale investigation conducted by responsible Members of Congress in a nonpartisan manner and in a way that would preserve the rights of individuals.

Mr. Speaker, I should like to include with my remarks a column which appeared today in the Washington Daily News and which was written by one of its top columnists, Mr. Ed Koterba. I believe it demonstrates so well one of the points I have been discussing here today.

Mr. Koterba's column follows:

THERE'S LOTS TO BE SAID ON SECRET EAGLE

(By Ed Koterba)

The press relations man at the Pentagon said, "I'm sorry, but that information is a military secret. It's classified."

The reporter said: "But I have the information before me at this moment. And he reeled it off. It gave all the detailed facts on the air-to-air missile, the Eagle."

On the Pentagon end of the phone there was shocked silence—followed by a dozen queries and, later, by a congressional request for a full-scale investigation.

This was one of several instances of apparent blundering by our side on military secrecy. Ironically enough, this case of opening up supposed secrets by the Pentagon came at a time when Russia was charging us before the world with obtaining military information from the Soviets.

TEXAS NEWSMAN

The reporter in this story is John Harris, Washington correspondent for a Houston, Tex., newspaper.

His information came from the "1960 Missile Handbook," which was distributed just down the hall in the National Press Building.

A few days after his story was printed, a bigshot Communist, Valdimir D. Pavlov, third secretary of the Soviet Embassy, showed up and procured a copy of the book, paying the asking price of \$2.

Oddly enough, Mr. Harris' story did not identify by name nor location his source of information.

Publisher of the missile handbook is Kendall K. Hoyt, director of the Association of Missile and Rocket Industries.

When I confronted Mr. Hoyt, he said: "We have information on 300 U.S. missiles." He showed me his bulging files.

DATA

Data on the secret Eagle showed that it was 15 to 20 feet tall, weighed a half-ton, had a range of 100 miles and flies up to 100,000 feet. All this information was marked classified at the Pentagon.

"For heaven's sakes," I said to Mr. Hoyt, "where did you get all this information?" Calmly, he said he got it from the Aircraft & Missiles magazine, which is distributed to 9,000 firms. Originally, he said, it came from—all of all things—Pentagon handouts.

But, to be on the safe side, he said, he checked with the Federal Bureau of Investigation when the Communist—who openly identified himself as a Soviet technician—showed up in his office. The FBI, Mr. Hoyt said, cleared the sale.

And what is the Red official going to do with all that compiled information?

Over the phone he said, candidly: "Some of our Soviet scientists may be interested."

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 1 minute in order to inquire of the majority leader as to any changes in the program for next week.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I am glad my friend makes that inquiry because I do want to advise the House that since announcing the program, and you will remember I referred to the bill, S. 1892, having to do with the project in Oklahoma, I have had the opportunity since announcing the program to talk with the chairman of the Committee on